Rent seeking and the presence of existing distortions by Robson, Alex
 
 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 
 
 
Rent Seeking and the Presence of Existing Distortions 
 
Alex Robson 
School of Economics 
Australian National University 
Canberra, ACT 
Australia 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 448 
 
April 2005 
 
 
ISBN: 086831 448 X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rent Seeking and the Presence of Existing Distortions
Alex Robson∗
Abstract
When market distortions already exist, producers may attempt to surpress or en-
courage the establishment of new distortions in hitherto undistorted markets, and may
have a strong incentive to appeal to the language of second best to further their pri-
vate interests. In these situations, the total amount of resources spent on trying to
encourage or discourage intervention in an undistorted market can exceed the sum
of the partial equilibrium Harberger (1964) “triangle” and Tullock (1967) “rectangle”
measures of welfare loss. This paper uses a simple example to illustrate these points.
“A third general set of powers of the state which will be sought by the industry
are those which aﬀect substitutes and complements. Crudely put, the butter
producers wish to suppress margarine and encourage the production of bread.”
- George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, page 6.
1. Introduction
When distortions in markets already exist, producers in these distorted markets may have
an incentive to surpress or encourage the establishment of new distortions in hitherto undis-
torted markets. The incentive for this inter—industry lobbying is often at its strongest when
the welfare eﬀects of an existing distortion can, in theory, be “unravelled” by the introduc-
tion of a new distortion in another related market. In other words, firms which already
enjoy rents may sometimes have a strong incentive to appeal to the language of second best
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) to further their private interests. This phenomenon is sum-
marized perfectly by George Stigler’s “crude” observation that “butter producers wish to
suppress margarine and encourage the production of bread.”
This paper illustrates the proposition that in these situations, the total amount of re-
sources spent on trying to encourage or discourage government intervention in an undistorted
market can exceed the sum of the partial equilibrium Harberger (1964) “triangle” and Tul-
lock (1967) “rectangle” measures, because the creation of a new distortion can enlarge or
reduce the “rectangles” that already exist in distorted markets. In the rent seeking society,
there are usually a great many existing economic distortions, and a more complete analysis
of rent—seeking behaviour and its costs should pay at least some attention to these costs.
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2. An Example
To focus the analysis, consider a general equilibrium version of the welfare cost of an excise
tax, which Tullock (1967) uses in his classic paper to motivate the welfare costs of rent
seeking. Consider an economy with constant marginal costs of production and N > 2
markets. Consider two of these markets, A and B, and suppose that marginal costs are zero
in both of these markets. Suppose the government is considering placing a specific tax in
Market B, the revenue from which will be returned to producers in that market. Market
A is already subject to a similar distortion of a specific tax of tA, with producers enjoying
a lump-sum transfer of taxation revenue. All other markets are competitive and are not
subject to regulation or intervention of any kind.
The situation is illustrated in the diagram below. The initial imposition of the tax in
A causes a reduction in consumption in market A (from x0A to x
1
A), and, since the goods
are substitutes, causes consumers to demand more of good B at every price (their ordinary
demand curve shifts from DB to D
0
B and they increase their consumption of good B from x
0
B
to x1B). As a result of tA, the consumer ends up at the point marked “1” in each market.
The tax in A of course has its own welfare costs and rent seeking costs, but we want to focus
on the eﬀect of introducing an additional distortion in a separate but related market.
0
Ap
0
Ax
0
Bp
10
A Ap t+ 20B Bp t+
2
1
Ax
2
Ax
0
Bx
1
Bx
2
Bx
1A
D 'AD
Ap
Market A Market B
BD
'BD
Bp
Figure 1: A Tax in Market B With an Existing Tax in Market A; A and B are substitutes.
To this end, consider the imposition of a tax of tB in market B. The imposition of
the tax in B causes a reduction in consumption in market B (from x1B to x
2
B), and, since
the goods are substitutes, leads consumers to demand more of good A at every price (they
increase their consumption of good A from x1A to x
2
A). As a result of tB, the consumer ends
up at the point marked “2” in each market.
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The traditional Harberger measure of the additional excess burden of the tax in market
B is the sum of the triangle in market B, less the additional revenue collected in Market A.
To understand this, note that, according to the theory of second-best, imposing the tax in
market B partially “unravels” the existing distortion in market A and may even be welfare
enhancing, relative to the initial distorted equilibrium. This will be the case if the additional
revenue generated by the rectangle in market A due to the imposition of tB exceeds the size
of the triangle in market B. Indeed, when there are only two goods in the economy, a tax of
equal proportions in each market is equivalent to a lump sum tax on the consumer’s income
and will create no distortion precisely for this reason. As an aside, we note that by the
first welfare theorem such combinations of taxes can never Pareto improve on the initial,
undistorted competitive equilibrium at the point (x0A, x
0
B).
Tullock (1967) argues persuasively that in this setting, at least part of the revenue gener-
ated by the tax in market B (and, under some conditions, all of it) should be considered social
waste. Producers in market B will use resources to capture the revenues and consumers
will presumably use resources to oppose the tax. The devotion of these resources does not
generate any additional production or income, and instead merely redistributes income, so
they must be considered socially wasteful.
However, there are additional rent-seeking costs which should be taken into account.
Because the goods are substitutes and because there is an existing distortion in market A,
the distortion in market B creates additional revenue in both markets. Since we have as-
sumed that all of the revenue is being returned to producers in these industries, they will,
for the same reasons pointed out by Tullock, be willing to use valuable resources to capture
it. In this particular case, the producers in market A will lobby in favour of the inter-
vention in market B, precisely because they gain additional revenue from this intervention.
Thus, even taking into account Tullock’s (1967) critique, the partial equilibrium measure of
welfare change of the sum of the triangle and rectangle in market B will underestimate the
potential welfare losses than can occur. Producers in both markets will lobby in favor of
the intervention.
Thus, assuming that the total amount of taxation revenue generated by tB is not overdis-
sipated1, then the measure:
∆WB = tBx
2
B +
1
2
tB
¡
x1B − x2B
¢
+ tA
¡
x2A − x1A
¢
(1)
is an upper bound for the total welfare change that occurs as a result of intervening in
market B. The first term is the usual Tullock rectangle in market B. The second term
is the usual Harberger triangle in market B, and the third term is the rectangle in market
A. In can be thought of as a “Harberger—Tullock rectangle”, because it combines Tullock’s
(1967) insights about rent-seeking with Harberger’s careful accounting of the welfare eﬀects
of taxes in a general equilibrium setting when there are existing distortions in other markets.
In the theory of second best and the world of conventional welfare economics, the term
1Of course, if the rules of the rent-seeking contest or the rent seeking technology are such that over-
dissipation of the market B rectangle is possible, then it follows that over-dissipation of the sum of the
rectangles in markets A and B is also possible, for the very same reasons. In this case, the measure in
equation (1) will underestimate the welfare loss from the intervention in market B.
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tA (x
2
A − x1A) is counted as a gain because it represents revenue that the government would
not have otherwise received from the imposition of tA. In contrast, in the study of the
rent—seeking society it must be counted as a potential welfare loss.
The welfare cost of marginally changing tB in this framework can also be computed.
Suppose that there are existing taxes in both markets. The change in the Harberger triangle
in market B is:
tB
∂xB
∂pB
and the change in revenue2 in market B is:
xB + tB
∂xB
∂pB
Finally, the change in revenue in market A is:
tA
∂xA
∂pB
The term tA
∂xA
∂pB
, which captures cross-market price eﬀects, can be positive, negative or zero.
If it is negative, then rent-seekers in market A will stand to lose revenue from the marginal
tax change in market B, and so would be willing to spend an amount tA
∂xA
∂pB
to stop the
change. Thus, it is the absolute value of tA
∂xA
∂pB
which is relevant for placing bounds on the
potential size of rent seeking costs. In other words, an upper bound for the welfare cost of
a marginal change in tB is:
∂W
∂tB
= tB
∂xB
∂pB
+
½
xB + tB
∂xB
∂pB
¾
+ tA
¯¯¯¯
∂xA
∂pB
¯¯¯¯
(2)
= xB + 2tB
∂xB
∂pB
+ tA
¯¯¯¯
∂xA
∂pB
¯¯¯¯
(3)
This is similar to the usual expression derived by Harberger (1971) for the marginal welfare
eﬀect of changing the distortion in market B, with the critical diﬀerences that in the rent-
seeking society the marginal gains (and losses) of revenue in markets B and from increasing
tB could potentially be spent on wasteful projects or, if the revenue is returned to producers,
be dissipated away in rent seeking expenditures.
Note that, in constrast to the Harberger approach, the absolute value of cross market
eﬀects
¯¯¯¯
∂xA
∂pB
¯¯¯¯
must be taken into account, rather than
∂xA
∂pB
. Also note that, in general, the
2We are assuming here that the marginal tax revenue in market B, xB + tB
∂xB
∂pB
is positive. This means
that we are on the inelastic part of the demand curve for good B, or the downward sloping part of the
Laﬀer curve for tB. If this was not the case, then an increase in tB would reduce revenue in market B, and
producers in market B would lobby in favour of tax reductions, rather than tax increases.
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sequence of interventions will matter for the estimation of such costs, unless
∂xA
∂pB
=
∂xB
∂pA
.
With ordinary demand curves this will not be the case, unless
∂xA
∂m
=
∂xB
∂m
= 0 so that
the ordinary demand curves correspond with the compensated demand curves (i.e.there are
no income eﬀects on goods A and B). Indeed, under the right conditions, if the producers
in B are suﬃciently farsighted, they may lobby for an intervention in market A before the
intervention takes place in market B so as to maximize their revenue further down the track.
3. Does the Degree of Substitutability Matter?
In the above example we assumed that the goods were substitutes. But the analysis works
just as well if the goods are assumed to be complements. This is illustrated in the diagram
below.
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Figure 2: A Tax in Market B With an Existing Tax in Market A - A and B are
complements.
The imposition of the tax in A again causes a reduction in consumption in market A
(from x0A to x
1
A), and, since the goods are complements, causes consumers to demand less of
good B at every price (their demand curve shifts left from DB to D
0
B and they reduce their
consumption of good B from x0B to x
1
B). Again, the tax in A of course has its own welfare
costs and rent seeking costs, but we want to focus on the eﬀect of introducing an additional
distortion in a separate but related market. To this end, consider the imposition of a tax of
tB in market B. The imposition of the tax in B causes a further reduction in consumption
in market B (from x1B to x
2
B), and, since the goods are complements, causes consumers to
demand less of good A at every price (they reduce their consumption of good A from x1A to
x2A).
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Thus, when A and B are gross complements, the introduction of the tax in market B
reduces the revenue generated in market A. Such a tax can never be welfare enhancing in the
second-best sense because the new distortion only “reinforces” the initial distortion instead
of “unravelling” it. Producers in market B will support the change for the same reasons as
before (since the imposition of tB still generates revenue in that market), but producers in
market A will oppose the change because revenue in market A declines.
However, it is again the case that the partial equilibrium measure of the welfare cost
of the intervention in market B could exceed the sum of the usual Harberger costs and
Tullock costs, precisely because producers in A stand to lose part of the tax revenue which
was available to them before the tax in market B was imposed. They will again have an
economic interest at stake in this intervention, but in this case will devote resources in an
eﬀort to prevent the change taking place. In other words, butter producers wish to suppress
margarine and encourage the production of bread.
More generally, suppose there are N markets, N − 1 of which are already distorted
in the way described above. Consider the welfare cost of introducing a distortion in the
Nth market. Let xinitialN and x
final
N be the consumption of good N before and after the
intervention, respectively. Then the above considerations lead to a measure of:
∆W = tNx
final
N +
1
2
tN
³
xinitialN − x
final
N
´
+
N−1X
i=1
ti |∆xi| (4)
This is simply the usual Tullock rectangle in market N , plus the usual Harberger triangle in
market N , plus the absolute magnitude of the cross eﬀects generated in other markets. In
traditional welfare economics, these terms may be positive or negative depending on whether
good N is a substitute or complement for the other N − 1 goods. But in our analysis these
terms represent potential revenue gains or losses to rent-seekers, who will use resources to
try to either capture such revenue streams or avoid losing them. Therefore, in the rent
seeking society they represent potential welfare losses.
For marginal changes, we simply have a generalisation of equation (2):
∂W
∂tN
= xN + 2tN
∂xN
∂pN
+
N−1X
i=1
ti
¯¯¯¯
∂xi
∂pN
¯¯¯¯
It is clear from the analysis that the only case where these considerations are irrelevant are
when the goods are neither substitutes or complements. In that case, the welfare loss of
introducing the tax in the undistorted market is equal to its partial equilibrium measure,
and accounting for rectangle changes in other markets simply amounts to counting zeros.
Thus, for the purposes of our analysis, substitutability and complementarity matter if and
only they are non—trivial in the usual economic sense.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has argued that the welfare costs of interventions can in some cases exceed the
sum of the usual partial equilibrium measures developed by Harberger and Tullock. We
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have only used the simplest and most straightforward types of interventions to illustrate
our main point. Accounting for the eﬀects of other kinds of interventions such as price
and wage controls, production quotas and so on is an interesting but more challenging
exercise, because new interventions and distortions of this type often interact with existing
distortions in an unpredictable fashion. Thus, when trying to account for the possible
incentives for establishing new distortions in already-distorted economies, it would seem that
the most analytically convenient course of action would be to follow the advice of Harberger
(1971) and only pay attention to those markets which (a) have economically significant
existing distortions and (b) interact with the market under consideration in an economically
significant way. If such considerations are taken into account, a more complete theory of
rent-seeking behaviour and its costs will be possible.
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